phisherslapper/docs/dns.html

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<title>phisherslapper Developer Docs - Package dns</title>
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<font color="#b58900"><h1>Package dns</h1></font>
<p>Domain normalization, syntax validation, DNS pre-flight resolution
checks, multi-resolver consistency cross-checks, static hosts-file
override detection, origin-AS attribution, and SPF/DMARC sender-authority
probes. Sources: <tt>internal/dns/dns.go</tt>,
<tt>internal/dns/resolvers.go</tt>, <tt>internal/dns/hosts.go</tt>,
<tt>internal/dns/asn.go</tt>, <tt>internal/dns/spf.go</tt>.</p>
<hr>
<a name="NormalizeDomain"></a>
<font color="#859900"><h2>NormalizeDomain</h2></font>
<table border="0" cellpadding="8" width="100%"><tr><td bgcolor="#073642"><pre>func NormalizeDomain(d string) string</pre></td></tr></table>
<p>Lowercases the input and strips scheme, path, port, and trailing dot.
Mirrors the shell <tt>normalize_domain</tt> helper.</p>
<table border="0" cellpadding="8" width="100%"><tr><td bgcolor="#073642"><pre>dns.NormalizeDomain("HTTPS://Example.COM:8443/path")
// =&gt; "example.com"</pre></td></tr></table>
<hr>
<a name="ValidSyntax"></a>
<font color="#859900"><h2>ValidSyntax</h2></font>
<table border="0" cellpadding="8" width="100%"><tr><td bgcolor="#073642"><pre>func ValidSyntax(d string) bool</pre></td></tr></table>
<p>Reports whether <tt>d</tt> looks like a dotted domain name: labels of
alphanumerics and hyphens with at least one dot. Used to reject malformed
input before any network call.</p>
<table border="0" cellpadding="8" width="100%"><tr><td bgcolor="#073642"><pre>dns.ValidSyntax("jdsoft.com") // =&gt; true
dns.ValidSyntax("no-dot") // =&gt; false</pre></td></tr></table>
<hr>
<a name="DomainCheck"></a>
<font color="#859900"><h2>DomainCheck</h2></font>
<table border="0" cellpadding="8" width="100%"><tr><td bgcolor="#073642"><pre>type DomainCheck struct {
SystemLive bool
PublicLive bool
SystemAddrs []net.IP
PublicAddrs []net.IP
HostsHit bool
HostsIP string
Consistency Consistency
}</pre></td></tr></table>
<p>One domain's full probe: system liveness for pre-flight gating, public
liveness for suppression attribution, the aggregate consistency
verdict, the first live A record per side (retained for per-path
interrogation — never scored by raw address), and the hosts-file override
state. The pre-flight gate aborts on system failure and reuses these
outcomes downstream, so each resolver is queried exactly once per
domain.</p>
<hr>
<a name="CheckDomain"></a>
<font color="#859900"><h2>CheckDomain</h2></font>
<table border="0" cellpadding="8" width="100%"><tr><td bgcolor="#073642"><pre>func CheckDomain(ctx context.Context, domain string, timeout time.Duration) DomainCheck</pre></td></tr></table>
<p>Probes the system resolver and pinned public resolvers once. Use
<tt>SystemLive</tt> for NXDOMAIN gating and <tt>Consistency</tt> for
scoring and messaging.</p>
<hr>
<a name="Consistency"></a>
<font color="#859900"><h2>Consistency</h2></font>
<table border="0" cellpadding="8" width="100%"><tr><td bgcolor="#073642"><pre>type Consistency struct {
Checked bool
Tampered bool
Kind SplitKind
Detail string
}</pre></td></tr></table>
<p>Verdict of a multi-resolver cross-check. <tt>Detail</tt> names the
disagreeing resolvers and the split kind when tampered.</p>
<hr>
<a name="SplitKind"></a>
<font color="#859900"><h2>SplitKind</h2></font>
<table border="0" cellpadding="8" width="100%"><tr><td bgcolor="#073642"><pre>const (
SplitNone SplitKind = iota
SplitSuppression
SplitHorizon
SplitNS
)</pre></td></tr></table>
<p>Split direction. Suppression (system dark, public live) signals local
tampering; horizon (system live, public dark) is the expected split-horizon
shape of internal names and never scores; NS marks delegation splits.</p>
<hr>
<a name="CheckConsistency"></a>
<font color="#859900"><h2>CheckConsistency</h2></font>
<table border="0" cellpadding="8" width="100%"><tr><td bgcolor="#073642"><pre>func CheckConsistency(ctx context.Context, domain string, timeout time.Duration) Consistency</pre></td></tr></table>
<p>Queries the system resolver plus pinned 1.1.1.1 and 8.8.8.8 servers in
parallel (stdlib <tt>net.Resolver</tt> with a pinned dialer; filtered
resolvers excluded by design). Flags NXDOMAIN-vs-live splits and NS
delegation splits; raw A records are never compared, so CDN/GeoDNS churn
stays quiet. Inconclusive resolvers abstain, and fewer than two conclusive
votes is never tampering. Never fails closed.</p>
<table border="1" cellpadding="4">
<tr><th>Parameter</th><th>Description</th></tr>
<tr><td><tt>ctx</tt></td><td>Parent context; the global 15 second budget.</td></tr>
<tr><td><tt>domain</tt></td><td>Already-normalized domain to cross-check.</td></tr>
<tr><td><tt>timeout</tt></td><td>Per-resolver deadline (the CLI --timeout value).</td></tr>
</table>
<hr>
<a name="CheckHostsOverride"></a>
<font color="#859900"><h2>CheckHostsOverride</h2></font>
<table border="0" cellpadding="8" width="100%"><tr><td bgcolor="#073642"><pre>func CheckHostsOverride(domain string) (ip string, ok bool)</pre></td></tr></table>
<p>Reports a hardcoded static mapping for <tt>domain</tt> in the OS hosts
database (<tt>/etc/hosts</tt> on unix,
<tt>C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts</tt> on Windows — see
<tt>HostsPath</tt>). Such a mapping short-circuits every resolver, so no
cross-check can see it; it is probed once in pre-flight alongside the
resolver queries. Fail-open: unreadable or missing files simply report no
hit, never an error.</p>
<hr>
<a name="ParseHostsFile"></a>
<font color="#859900"><h2>ParseHostsFile</h2></font>
<table border="0" cellpadding="8" width="100%"><tr><td bgcolor="#073642"><pre>func ParseHostsFile(content, domain string) (string, bool)</pre></td></tr></table>
<p>Pure scanner behind <tt>CheckHostsOverride</tt>: ignores comment lines
and inline comments, matches hostnames case-insensitively (trailing-dot
tolerant), first mapping wins (OS resolver precedence). Safe to unit
test.</p>
<hr>
<a name="LookupASN"></a>
<font color="#859900"><h2>LookupASN</h2></font>
<table border="0" cellpadding="8" width="100%"><tr><td bgcolor="#073642"><pre>func LookupASN(ctx context.Context, ip net.IP, timeout time.Duration) (ASNInfo, bool)</pre></td></tr></table>
<p>Attributes <tt>ip</tt> to its origin autonomous system via Team
Cymru's DNS service (<tt>&lt;reversed-octets&gt;.origin.asn.cymru.com</tt>
TXT), queried through the pinned 1.1.1.1 resolver — never the system
resolver, so a poisoned local resolver cannot attest to its own
redirection. IPv4 only (IPv6 reports not-ok). Fail-open: unanswered or
unparsable queries yield not-ok. Result type:</p>
<table border="0" cellpadding="8" width="100%"><tr><td bgcolor="#073642"><pre>type ASNInfo struct {
ASN string // origin AS number, e.g. "15169"
Prefix string // announced prefix, e.g. "8.8.8.0/24"
CC string // registrant country code, e.g. "US"
}</pre></td></tr></table>
<hr>
<a name="ParseCymruTXT"></a>
<font color="#859900"><h2>ParseCymruTXT</h2></font>
<table border="0" cellpadding="8" width="100%"><tr><td bgcolor="#073642"><pre>func ParseCymruTXT(txt string) (ASNInfo, bool)</pre></td></tr></table>
<p>Pure parser for one Cymru origin answer
(<tt>"15169 | 8.8.8.0/24 | US | arin | 1992-12-01"</tt>). Companion
helpers: <tt>ASNQueryName</tt> builds the query name (false for IPv6),
<tt>ASNMatch</tt> reports a shared origin AS (unknown sides never
match).</p>
<hr>
<a name="CheckSPFAuthority"></a>
<font color="#859900"><h2>CheckSPFAuthority</h2></font>
<table border="0" cellpadding="8" width="100%"><tr><td bgcolor="#073642"><pre>func CheckSPFAuthority(ctx context.Context, target string, suspectIP net.IP, timeout time.Duration) (SPFResult, bool)</pre></td></tr></table>
<p>Evaluates the target's <tt>v=spf1</tt> record for the suspect's IP (RFC
7208 mechanism subset: <tt>ip4</tt>/<tt>ip6</tt> CIDRs, <tt>a</tt>,
<tt>mx</tt>, recursive <tt>include:</tt>, <tt>redirect=</tt>; only a
<tt>+</tt>-qualifier match authorizes). Recursive includes share the RFC
10-lookup budget; macro mechanisms, multiple <tt>v=spf1</tt> records, and
lookup errors all fail open (not-ok). Result type:</p>
<table border="0" cellpadding="8" width="100%"><tr><td bgcolor="#073642"><pre>type SPFResult struct {
Authorized bool // the IP is covered by a pass-qualifier mechanism
Cover string // the covering mechanism, e.g. "include:_spf.google.com"
}</pre></td></tr></table>
<hr>
<a name="CheckDMARC"></a>
<font color="#859900"><h2>CheckDMARC</h2></font>
<table border="0" cellpadding="8" width="100%"><tr><td bgcolor="#073642"><pre>func CheckDMARC(ctx context.Context, target string, timeout time.Duration) (string, bool)</pre></td></tr></table>
<p>Reads the target's DMARC enforcement policy (<tt>none</tt>,
<tt>quarantine</tt>, <tt>reject</tt>) from
<tt>_dmarc.&lt;target&gt;</tt> TXT through the pinned resolver.
Display-only context (a <tt>p=reject</tt> target tolerates no
unauthorized senders); fail-open on any problem.</p>
<hr>
<font color="#b58900">Licensed under the GNU General Public License v3 - Mark Robillard Jr (MARKMENTAL)</font>
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