296 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
296 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
# phisherslapper [v1.03]
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> **Note:** `isthislegit` has been renamed to `phisherslapper`. We do not
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> condone physical violence against phishers — but you are warmly encouraged
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> to metaphorically slap them with this tool's output in your reply the next
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> time they try to scam you.
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Domain impersonation triage — auditing the identity claims websites make
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in their TLS certificates, and exposing the bad cryptographic hygiene of
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untrustworthy actors.
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Every website stakes an identity claim in its X.509 leaf certificate, and
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strong claims cost real money to fake. Legitimate organizations show
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discipline: Extended or Organization Validation (a CA actually vetted the
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*company*, not just the domain), a consistent corporate issuer, a curated
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SAN portfolio of real products, and the same TLS identity on every network
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path. Untrustworthy actors leak hygiene gaps at every turn: free automated
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DV certificates issued in minutes, one-domain SAN sets naming only the
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clone itself, a validation downgrade from the target's EV/OV to DV, and
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sometimes a different certificate served depending on which DNS answer you
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believe. `phisherslapper` reads the claim straight from the certificate —
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policy OIDs, issuer, SANs, leaf fingerprints — then cross-examines it
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against DNS resolution (system plus pinned public resolvers), RDAP
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registration, SPF/DMARC sender authority, and origin-AS infrastructure,
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scoring every gap it finds.
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`phisherslapper` compares a known-legitimate domain (target) against a suspect
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domain using DNS resolution, X.509 TLS certificates, and RDAP registration
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data to produce a deterministic risk score and verdict. DNS answers are
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cross-checked across the system resolver, 1.1.1.1, and 8.8.8.8 for
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split-brain or hijacking signals (state consistency only — raw addresses
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are never compared, so CDN/GeoDNS fronting stays quiet). Each unique
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domain is probed once and the outcomes reused; even identical
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target/suspect pairs run the full pipeline (verdict forced to legitimate).
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System-dark/public-live suppression splits score on the suspect, while
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split-horizon shapes stay display-only. It ships as a single
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static binary built on the Go standard library (plus `golang.org/x/sync` for
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the concurrent fetch pipeline) — no `curl`, `openssl`, `jq`, or `dig`
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required.
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## Features
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- **X.509 identity analysis** — leaf certificate issuer, SANs, and validation
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level (EV / OV / IV / DV) from CA/Browser Forum policy OIDs. The claim
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itself is the evidence.
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- **Rogue-redirection probes** — per-path TLS identity comparison (local
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vs public endpoint), origin-AS attribution via Team Cymru, and a
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hosts-file override check.
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- **Relationship classification** — identical, SAN/SPF-endorsed, lookalike
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(confusable-aware label similarity), or unrelated. `LIKELY LEGITIMATE`
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requires a relationship; unrelated pairs read `UNRELATED — NO AUTHORITY
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OVER TARGET` instead of a false-negative legitimate.
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- **Sender authority** — target SPF evaluation (RFC 7208 subset, pinned
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resolver) for the suspect IP, plus target DMARC policy as context.
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- **DNS pre-flight** — NXDOMAIN / unresolvable domains abort early.
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- **RDAP triage** — creation date and registrar via `https://rdap.org/domain/`.
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- **Deterministic scoring** — transparent point system with a five-way verdict.
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- **Flexible output** — human-readable report, `--json` for scripting,
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`--verbose` for raw OIDs, cert details, and RDAP payloads.
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## TLS identity analysis
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The certificate is the suspect's own testimony, and `phisherslapper`
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treats it that way. Each property below is read directly from the leaf
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certificate and scored when it contradicts the target's established
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identity:
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| Property | What it reveals |
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|---|---|
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| Policy OIDs → EV / OV / IV / DV class | Identity-strength of the claim: an organization-vetted EV/OV cert vs a DV cert any script can mint in five minutes |
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| Issuer organization | A corporate CA standing behind the claim vs a free automated CA on a supposed "corporate" clone |
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| SAN portfolio | Endorsement: the target's cert names the suspect's infrastructure — or a single-domain SAN naming only the clone |
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| Leaf SHA-256 fingerprint, per resolution path | The same identity served everywhere vs a different certificate depending on which DNS answer you believe (rogue redirection, +50) |
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| Validation downgrade, target EV/OV → suspect DV | +40: the suspect can't or won't maintain the validation level the real brand pays for |
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The classic phishing shape is cheap crypto stacked on a young identity:
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DV-only, days-old registration, a budget registrar with no overlap with
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the target's brand-protection registrar. Each gap scores on its own; the
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worked contrast below shows how they add up:
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```text
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Legitimate claim Sketchy claim
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EV cert via a corporate CA DV cert from a free automated CA
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SANs: brand.com + 20 product domains SANs: one domain — the clone itself
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Registered 2003, corporate registrar Registered 3 weeks ago, budget registrar
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Same TLS identity on every path Different cert per DNS path
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Finding tripped: DOWNGRADE +40, MISMATCH +30,
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CRITICAL age +80, REDIRECTION +50
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```
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## Prerequisites
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- Go 1.24 or newer.
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- Network access to DNS, remote port 443, and `rdap.org`. Origin-AS
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attribution queries `origin.asn.cymru.com` (Team Cymru) through
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1.1.1.1; if that zone is unreachable the ASN signal fails open.
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## Clone, build, run
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```bash
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git clone https://github.com/MARKMENTAL/phisherslapper.git
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cd phisherslapper
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CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -ldflags="-s -w" -o phisherslapper ./cmd/phisherslapper
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./phisherslapper jdsoft.com jdsoftcareers.com
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```
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Run the test suite with:
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```bash
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go test ./...
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```
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### Cross-compiling with compile.go
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`compile.go` (repo root) is the supported build driver. It cross-compiles
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`./cmd/phisherslapper` for a platform/arch matrix, always with
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`CGO_ENABLED=0`, so every target builds without a cross C toolchain:
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```bash
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go run ./compile.go --platform=linux --arch=amd64
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```
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| Flag | Default | Description |
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|--------------|---------|----------------------------------------------------------|
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| `--platform` | `linux` | Target OS (see vocabulary below). |
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| `--arch` | `amd64` | Target arch (see vocabulary below). |
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| `--static` | `true` | `true` for static (`CGO_ENABLED=0`), `false` for dynamic (`CGO_ENABLED=1`, host builds only unless `CC` points at a cross compiler). Both modes are stripped via `-ldflags="-s -w"`. |
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Platform vocabulary (case-insensitive): `linux`; `mac`/`macos`/`osx`/`darwin`
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→ `darwin`; `windows`/`win` → `windows`; `bsd` → all three of `freebsd`,
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`openbsd`, `netbsd` in one run (or name a single BSD explicitly).
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Arch vocabulary: raw `GOARCH` names plus aliases — `x64`/`x86-64` → `amd64`;
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`x86`/`i386`/`32bit` → `386`; `aarch64` → `arm64`; `arm`/`armv7`/`armv6`/`armv5`
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→ `arm` with matching `GOARM`. Unknown values exit 1, and combos the
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toolchain does not support (e.g. `darwin/386`) are refused with a clear
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error.
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Output binaries are named `phisherslapper-<goos>-<goarch>` (with a `vGOARM`
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suffix when applicable, e.g. `phisherslapper-linux-armv7`, and `.exe` on
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Windows):
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```bash
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go run ./compile.go --platform=linux --arch=amd64
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go run ./compile.go --platform=windows --arch=x64 --static=false
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go run ./compile.go --platform=bsd --arch=x64
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go run ./compile.go --platform=linux --arch=armv7 # embedded ARM (Miyoo Mini Plus)
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```
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## Flags
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| Flag | Description |
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|-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
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| `-v, --verbose` | Append raw cert policy OIDs, TLS details, and RDAP JSON. |
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| `-j, --json` | Output the result summary as JSON for scripting. |
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| `-k, --insecure`| Skip TLS verification for RDAP |
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| `--timeout=DUR` | Per-call deadline for DNS/TLS/RDAP (Go duration, default 5s). |
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| `--scale` | Print the scoring scale reference table and exit. |
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| `-h, --help` | Display usage and exit. |
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The JSON summary carries `verdict`, `relationship` (`identical` /
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`san_endorsed` / `spf_endorsed` / `lookalike` / `unrelated`), a
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`suspect_spf` object (`checked`, `authorized`, `cover`), `target_dmarc`,
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and per-path `target_paths` / `suspect_paths` objects.
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Examples:
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```bash
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phisherslapper jdsoft.com jdsoftcareers.com
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phisherslapper -j example.com suspect-example.com
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phisherslapper --timeout=10s example.com suspect-example.com
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phisherslapper --scale
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```
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### Embedded systems (no CA certificates)
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`phisherslapper` runs on embedded ARM devices (verified on a Miyoo Mini Plus),
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but minimal firmware images often ship without a CA certificate store. In
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that case DNS resolution and certificate inspection still work, while
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verified HTTPS (RDAP) fails — the fail-closed error will say so directly
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(`x509: certificate signed by unknown authority`). Prefer installing
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`ca-certificates` and fixing the system clock where possible; otherwise use
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insecure mode:
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```bash
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phisherslapper -k jdsoft.com jdsoftcareers.com
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```
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`--insecure` prints a warning and weakens results, so treat it as a last
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resort for devices without stored CA certificates.
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## Example output
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```text
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phisherslapper [v1.03]
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Domain Impersonation & OSINT Triage Tool
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[*] Comparing: example.com (Target) <---> example.org (Suspect)
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[*] Relationship: unrelated
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[+] Target Domain: example.com
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|-- Creation Date : 1995-08-14
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|-- Registrar : RESERVED-Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
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|-- Cert Issuer : SSL Corporation
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|-- Validation : DV (Domain Validated)
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|-- Cert SANs : example.com, *.example.com
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[-] Suspect Domain: example.org
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|-- Creation Date : 1995-08-31
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|-- Registrar : ICANN
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|-- Cert Issuer : SSL Corporation
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|-- Validation : DV (Domain Validated)
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|-- Cert SANs : example.org, *.example.org
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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[!] RISK ANALYSIS (score: 30):
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[!] MISMATCH: Registrars do not align (RESERVED-Internet Assigned Numbers Authority vs ICANN).
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[!] NO AUTHORITY: example.org is a legitimate domain but holds no authorization to act for example.com (absent from target SANs, not SPF-endorsed). Zero-trust: any email or link using it in example.com's name is hostile.
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VERDICT: UNRELATED — NO AUTHORITY OVER TARGET
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```
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## Scoring scale
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| Signal | Points |
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|---------------------------------------------|--------|
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| Suspect < 30d (CRITICAL), stacked w/ signal | +80 |
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| Suspect < 30d (CRITICAL), isolated | +40 |
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| Suspect 30–89d (WARNING), stacked w/ signal | +40 |
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| Suspect 30–89d (WARNING), isolated | +20 |
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| Shared cert infrastructure (halves age tier)| x0.5 |
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| Identical target/suspect (forced LEGITIMATE) | +0 |
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| Resolution tampering: suppression split (suspect) | +50 |
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| DNS split-horizon / target-side (display only) | +0 |
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| Cert downgrade: target EV/OV vs suspect DV | +40 |
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| Registrar mismatch | +30 |
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| Same-class issuer difference (display only) | +0 |
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| Rogue TLS: per-path cert divergence (suspect) | +50 |
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| Rogue ASN: per-path AS split (suspect) | +30 |
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| Hosts-file override (suspect) | +50 |
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| Rogue signals target-side/inconclusive (info) | +0 |
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| Chronology inversion: suspect far older than young target (info) | +0 |
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| Score | Verdict |
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|-------|----------------------------------------|
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| 0–14 | LIKELY LEGITIMATE (related pair) |
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| 15–39 | LIKELY MALICIOUS OR NEGLIGENT |
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| 40–50 | SUSPICIOUS — MANUAL REVIEW RECOMMENDED |
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| 51+ | LIKELY PHISHING / IMPERSONATION ATTEMPT|
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| 0–39* | UNRELATED — NO AUTHORITY OVER TARGET |
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\* Unrelated pair: no shared SANs, SPF coverage, or label similarity.
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`LIKELY LEGITIMATE` requires a relationship (SAN/SPF-endorsed or
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lookalike) — two clean companies sharing nothing still means zero
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cross-domain authority, so the verdict never reads legitimate for them
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(no `google.com` vs `chatgpt.com` false negatives).
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The 15–39 band means the suspect's infrastructure contradicts a legitimate
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identity. Scenario A (likely): deliberately built malicious infrastructure
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— hidden identity, spoofed headers, sketchy proxies. Scenario B (virtually
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impossible for a real business): incompetence so severe no legitimate
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operator this broken survives long enough to do business with you. Either
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way, do not trust the domain.
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A suspect far older than a very young target (under 90 days vs over a
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year) trips a display-only `CHRONOLOGY` finding instead of points: a
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days-old "brand" has nothing to protect, so the pair was likely fed
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backwards and the "target" is the imposter. Re-run with the established
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brand as the target.
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Lookups fail closed: if RDAP dates or TLS data cannot be retrieved for
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either domain, the tool errors out instead of printing a verdict built on
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missing data, and the message names the underlying cause(s) (e.g. a TLS
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verification failure, which on minimal devices usually means missing CA
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certificates or a wrong system clock). Fetches run concurrently under a
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15s global budget with 5s per-call deadlines (3 attempts each, adjustable
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via `--timeout`); `--insecure` skips RDAP TLS verification as a last
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resort, with a warning.
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## Project layout
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```text
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cmd/phisherslapper CLI parsing, fetch orchestration, output dispatch
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internal/dns Domain normalization, syntax checks, DNS pre-flight
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internal/cert TLS identity claims: leaf fetch, OID classification, per-path comparison
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internal/rdap RDAP client, creation date and registrar extraction
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internal/score Risk scoring and verdict mapping
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internal/report Human, JSON, scale, and verbose renderers
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```
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## License
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Copyright (C) 2026 Mark Robillard Jr (MARKMENTAL). `phisherslapper` is free
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software licensed under the GNU General Public License v3 — see
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[LICENSE](LICENSE) for the full text.
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